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No, You CAN'T: THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS "No" TO CHANGE
NaturalResources Defense Council v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency]
I. INTRODUCTION

One advantageous attribute shared by many administrative
agencies is an ability to respond quickly and effectively to changing
circumstances. And when an agency initially responds to changed
circumstances, it is often forced to do so without the benefit of clear
legislative guidance. In these situations, agency determinations shouldn't
be considered static. Rather, agency decisions in these circumstances are
obviously more fluid in nature. And in fact, the Supreme Court has
signaled its support for the proposition that it is permissible for agency
positions to fluctuate and change over time.2
However, as a result of the fluid nature of agency decisions,
agencies may take policy positions that are at odds with a previous
position. It is only natural that an agency, in determining the wisdom of
its policy in light of changed circumstances, will sometimes promulgate
new rules and regulations that conflict with previously established rules
and regulations.
In crafting regulations that result in conflicting positions, the
agency is undoubtedly determining policy "winners" and policy "losers."
And the scorned party often seeks judicial review of the administrative
action. In reviewing an agency's conflicting positions, the reviewing court
is forced to determine the degree of change that the court will tolerate.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A. 3 is a perfect
example of the scenario described above. Prior to the instant decision, the
Environmental Protection Agency ( hereinafter "EPA") reached a decision
that effectively made permit requirements for construction activities
'526 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2008).
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64
(1984).
"An initial agency interpretation is not carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to
engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of
its policy on a continuous basis." Id.
3
NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 591.
2
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associated with oil and gas exploration and production less stringent. The
Natural Resources Defense Council (hereinafter "NRDC") challenged
EPA's determination and contended that EPA's decision was contrary to
Congressional intent. Additionally, NRDC argued that EPA's action
would be detrimental to water quality. This note examines both the
decision and the analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in reaching its
conclusion. More importantly, this note discusses the implications of the
holding and examines the degree of flexibility the Ninth Circuit is willing
to offer to administrative agencies in the face of conflicting agency
determinations.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In June of 2006, EPA promulgated a final rule modifying its
interpretation of the Clean Water Act (hereinafter "CWA") in response to
Congress' adoption of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.4 EPA's modified
interpretation resulted in the exclusion of "construction activities
associated with oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operations or transmission facilities" from the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter
"NPDES") permit
requirement.5 Furthermore, EPA's modified interpretation continued to
exclude oil and gas-related construction activities from the NPDES permit
requirement even if these sites discharged storm water containing
sediment levels which contributed to a violation of a water quality
standard. 6
Prior to EPA's modification, EPA had required some of these sites
to obtain certain NPDES permits.7 EPA had specifically required large oil
and gas-related construction sites to obtain a NPDES permit because EPA

4Id. at 600;

see also Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-58, § 323, 119 Stat. 694
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2005)).
5
NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 600 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii) (2006).
6Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii) (2006)).
7
Id. at 597 (citing National Pollutant Discharge System Permit Application Regulations
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed.Reg. 48,033-34 (Nov. 16, 1990)). However, the
permit requirement only applied to oil and gas-related construction sites that were five
acres or larger in size. Id. at 595.
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believed that storm water discharges containing sediment had a negative
impact on water quality.8 Furthermore, EPA had intended to eventually
expand the permit requirement to include all oil and gas-related
construction activities, regardless of size. 9
NRDC filed its petition challenging EPA's modified interpretation
on June 23, 2006.10 NRDC and the other petitioners specifically asserted
that EPA's exclusion of oil and gas-related construction activities from the
NPDES permit requirement was contrary to Congressional intent and
constituted an impermissible interpretation of the Energy Policy Act's
amendments to the CWA. 1
In response, EPA contended that its modified interpretation was a
codification of Congress' unambiguous intent to exclude oil and gasrelated construction activities from the NPDES permit requirement. 12
EPA further asserted that, even if Congressional intent was ambiguous, its
interpretation was reasonable and permissible.13 Specifically, EPA
contended that its interpretation was reasonable because Congress had
prohibited EPA from requiring an NPDES permit for storm water
discharges from construction activities at oil and gas sites unless the site
discharged storm water contaminated with certain materials. 14 EPA noted
that sediment was noticeably absent from Congress' list of possible
contaminants. And because sediment is the pollutant most closely
associated with construction activities, EPA contended that Congress'
omission from the list of possible contaminants was not accidental.' 5

8

Id. at 597.
9 Id. at 598 (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Regulations for
Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Sotrm Water Discharges,
64 Fed.Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999)).
'0 Id. at 601.
"1Id; see also Brief of Petitioners at 36-38, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d
591 ( 9 th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-73217). The additional petitioners include Amigos Bravos,
the Powder River and OGAP. Brief of Petitioners at 4.
12 Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 600-01; Brief of Respondent at 25-26, Nat.
Resource Def. Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d 591 (9" Cir. 2008) (No. 06-73217).
"
14 Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 601; Brief of Respondent, supra note 12, at 44.
Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 601; Brief of Respondent, supra note 12, at 44-45.
1 Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 601; Brief of Respondent, supra note 12, at 44-45.
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Pursuant to federal statute, any interested private party may initiate
judicial review of designated actions of EPA's Administrator.' 6 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had the authority to directly review EPA's
action.17 Additionally, the court found that the associations, petitioning on
behalf of their members, satisfied association standing requirements.' 8
The court noted that the applicable standard of review was dictated
by the Administrative Procedure Act.' 9 Specifically, the Administrative
Procedure Act permitted the court to "set aside agency action...found to
be.. .arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law." 20
After applying this standard, the court held that the promulgated
rule, which excluded oil and gas-related construction activities from the
NPDES permit requirement even if the sites' storm water discharges
contained levels of sediment that would contribute to a violation of a water
quality standard, was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an
impermissible construction of the CWA. 2 1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework: The Clean Water Act
In an effort to protect the environmental integrity of the nation's
waters, Congress amended the CWA in 1972. 22 In furtherance of its
'6 Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 601 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F)); see Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the
cited section authorizes appellate review of EPA rules governing permit procedures.)
1 Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 601; see 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (200).
18
Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 602. In order to establish standing, the associations
had to demonstrate that the association's members would have standing to sue in their
own right and "the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose and
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members of the lawsuit." Id. at 601-02 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
I9
Id.
20
2 1
22

Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2000).

Id. at 608.
Id. at 594 (citing 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a) (2000)).
577
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stated objective, Congress empowered EPA to conduct the NPDES.2 3
Congress tempered the seemingly broad grant of regulatory authority by
requiring strict compliance with the CWA's provisions. 4 One such
provision required a permit for the discharge of any pollutant from any
point source.
Congress further amended the CWA by enacting the Water Quality
Act of 1987 (hereinafter "WQA").2 6 The WQA established a new
regulatory scheme for storm water runoff.27 However, one significant
exemption provided that the EPA administrator could not require a
NPDES permit for storm water runoff from oil, gas and mining operations
if the runoff was composed entirely of flows which were from
conveyances of precipitation and the runoff precipitation was not
"contaminated by contact with, or do[es] not come into contact with, any
overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, by
product or waste product." 28
When it enacted the CWA, Congress established a two-step
procedure for implementing the new storm water runoff scheme.2 9
Congress intentionally designed the staggered implementation procedure
to allow EPA to focus on the most serious problems first.30 Thus, the
NPDES permit process as it related to industrial activity was intended to
be implemented first. 3 1 In the first phase, EPA clarified the conditions
that would constitute 'contamination' in the context of storm water
discharges from "oil or gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operation, or transmission facilit[ies]."32 EPA further noted that
any storm water discharge from one of the specified sites that "contributed
to a violation of a water quality standard" would nullify the original
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b) (2000)).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)).
25 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000)).
26 Id. (citing Pub.L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified as amended in
scattered
U.S.C.)).
of
33
sections
27
id.
28
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. 1342(1)(2)(2000)).
29
Id. at 595 (citing 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2000).
30
Id. (citing 133 Con. Rec. 991 (1987)).
23

24 Id. (citing

321 Id.

Id. at 598 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1)(iii) (1990)).
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exemption and trigger the permit requirement. 33 Also, EPA determined
that construction activities related to oil and gas exploration, production
and processing were required to obtain the necessary NPDES permit as the
activities were outside the scope of the original exemption for oil and gasrelated sites. 34 At this time, however, EPA only applied the permit
requirements to those construction sites that disturbed more than five

acres. 3 5
In 1999, EPA moved to the second phase of the implementation of
NPDES
permit requirements. 36 In Phase II, EPA expanded the
the
permitting requirement to construction sites that disturbed between one
and five acres.37 However, these smaller sites had until March 10, 2003 to
obtain the required NPDES permit.38
In 2002, prior to the permit deadline, EPA re-examined its
previous treatment of construction activity related to oil and gas sites
under the NPDES and determined that approximately 30,000 oil and gas
sites could be affected by the permit requirement. 39 In order to further
consider this additional information, EPA postponed the deadline by
which the smallest sites were required to obtain a NPDES permit. 40
While EPA was in the process of determining an appropriate
course of action, Congress intervened with additional amendments to the

33

Id. at 598 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1)(iii)(C) (1990); see also 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(B) (2006)(providing two other circumstances that would require the
obtain a NPDES permit).
erator toRes.
o Natural
Def Council, 526 F.3d at 598 (citing 55 Fed.Reg. 49,990, 48,029 (Nov.
16, 1990)). EPA specifically found that construction related to the specified operations
are likely to discharge contaminated storm water runoff. NPDES Phase I Storm Water
Rule, 55 Fed.Reg. 48,029 (Nov. 16, 1990).
3 Nat. Res. Def Council, 536 F.3d at 595.
36 Id at 598. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System - Regulations for
Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges,
64 Fed.Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999)).
3
38

Id

Id. (citing 64 Fed.Reg. 68,840 (Dec. 8, 1999)).
' 9Id (citing NPDES Phase II Storm Water Rule67 Fed.Reg. 79,828 (Dec. 30, 2002)).
40 Id. (citing Deferral Rule, 68 Fed.Reg. 11,325 (Mar. 10, 2003). After the first
postponement, EPA again moved the permit deadline until June of 2006. Id. (citing 70
Fed.Reg. 11,560 (Mar. 9, 2005)).
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CWA that Congress included as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.41
When it enacted the Energy Policy Act, Congress altered the definition of
"oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations,
or transmission facilities" in an effort to bring related construction
activities within the scope of the original exemption. 42
With oil and gas facility-related construction sites clearly exempt
from the requirement of obtaining a NPDES permit, EPA then determined
that once these sites were exempt from the NPDES requirement, they
could not be required to obtain a permit even if their storm water
discharges included sediment levels that would contribute to a violation of
a water quality standard.4 3 EPA incorporated this reasoning into a final
rule that it promulgated in June of 2006.44 Thus, the final rule provided
that storm water discharges originating at oil and gas-related construction
activities were exempt from the NPDES permit requirement, even if the
storm water discharge contained sediment levels that would contribute to a
violation of a water quality standard.4 5
B. The Analytical Framework: Chevron and the Ninth Circuit
Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council is widely viewed
as the single-most influential administrative law-related Supreme Court
decision. W In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit's decision rests largely on
an application of principles found in the Chevron decision.4 7

41 Id at 599. (citing Pub.L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 694 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
4§2 1362(24)(2000))).

d

§ 122.26(a)(2)(ii) (2006)).
4 Id.
45 Id; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii) (2006).
46 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the PoliticalEconomy of
JudicialDeference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMrN L. REv. 657,687 (2004) (listing
Chevron as the most influential case out of sample of 221 administrative law cases).
47 See, e.g. NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 602-03 (citing Chevron as dictating
the standard of review and citing Chevron seven times).
43 Id. at 600 (citing 40 C.F.R.
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In Chevron, NRDC challenged EPA's interpretation of the Clean
Air Act.48 Thus, the United States Supreme Court was forced to
determine the permissibility of EPA's interpretation.4 9
In Chevron, EPA was contemplating various approaches to the
regulation of industrial pollution. 50 EPA originally opted to implement
one of the more restrictive approaches. 5 However, less than one year
later, a new administration took office and decided to reverse course by
implementing a different regulatory scheme.52 NRDC challenged the
reversal and asserted that the new interpretation was "contrary to the
terms, legislative history, and purposes of the amended Clean Air Act." 53
The Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the manner
in which a court should review an agency's interpretation of a statute. 54
The Court noted that a reviewing court should first look to Congressional
intent and determine whether Congress has unambiguously resolved the
issue.55 If Congress has not clearly resolved the issue, the Supreme Court
noted that the second step in the analysis is to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is permissible. 56
The Court also specifically noted that in reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a statute, a court should not substitute the agency's
decision with its own "unless it appears from the statute or the legislative
history that the accommodation is not one Congress would have
sanctioned."57 Furthermore, the Court noted that there was a long,
established history of judicial deference to agency determinations.5 8

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
Id.(noting that the Court's task was to determine whether EPA's interpretation was a
reasonable construction of the Clean Air Act).
'o Id. at 856-57 (citing 44 Fed.Reg. 51934 (Jan. 16, 1979)).
51 Id. at 857 (noting that this approach would
bring in more sources for review).
52 Id at 857-58.
5
1Id. at 842.
54Id. at 842-43.
48

49

55 Id.

5

Id at 843.
Id at 845 (citing U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961)).
58 See id. at 844-45.
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In applying its own test, the Supreme Court dismissed each one of
NRDC's contentions in turn. 59 In doing so, the Court clearly deferred to
the agency's interpretation.6 0 The Court specifically noted that courts
should defer to agency decisions that involve complex, technical
regulatory schemes, conflicting policies and detailed and reasonable
agency consideration. 6' Finally, the Court noted that agency decisions are
not "carved in stone" and that an agency must continuously evaluate the
"wisdom of its policy." 62
The Ninth Circuit itself has recognized that courts should generally
defer to agency determinations.63 In fact, the Ninth Circuit recently noted
that Chevron deference applies to "an agency's reversal of opinion." 64
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that inconsistent agency
decisions are entitled to less deference, but "an agency's interpretation
is.. .nevertheless entitled to deference, so long as the agency acknowledges
and explains the departure from its prior views." 65
IV. INSTANT DECISION

s See id. at 861-62 (refuting NRDC's contention that Congress intended a more
restrictive definition); Id. at 864 (rejecting NRDC's contention that the legislative history
indicated that Congress intended a more restrictive definition); Id. at 865-66 (rejecting
any policy-oriented judicial review).
6o Id. at 865-66 (
"When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether
it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of
such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
interest are not judicial ones...").
61
d. at 866.
62
Id. at 863-64.
63 See Resident Councils of Wash. v. Leavitt, 500 F.3d 1025, 1034 (
9 Cir. 2007); New
Edge Network, Inc. v. F.C.C., 461 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9" Cir. 2006); Seldovia Native
Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9" Cir. 1990).
6 New Edge Network, Inc., 461 F.3d at 1113.
65 Seldovia Native Ass'n Inc., 904 F.2d at 1346 (quoting Mobil Oil Co. v. E.P.A.,
871
F.2d 149, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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A. Chevron: The Analytical Framework
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis of the
challenged rule by noting that issues of an agency's statutory.
interpretation are governed by the two-step test established in Chevron.
As previously mentioned, the first step in determining the permissibility of
an agency's statutory interpretation is to determine whether Congress has
unambiguously expressed its intent on the issue.6 7 If Congress has not
expressed a clear intent, the second step is to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.6 8 The second step in the Chevron test can be further divided
depending on the nature of Congress' delegation to the agency. 69 If the
delegation is explicit, the court will invalidate the agency's interpretation
only if it is arbitrary and capricious. 70 However, if Congress' delegation
is merely implicit, then the court will defer to the agency's interpretation
so long as it is reasonable.
B. Step One: Congressional Intent
The Court began its analysis of Congressional intent by first
examining the statute's language and history. 72 The Court noted that the
statute in question, § 402(l)(2) of the CWA, initially provided an
exemption from the NPDES permit requirement for certain oil and gasrelated facilities.7 3 In the amended version, Congress expanded the
definition of "oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment
NaturalRes. Def Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d 591, 602 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
67
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
68
Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
69
6

70

id.

Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
7
1 d at 603.
7 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2)(2000)). In the original version of § 402(l)(2), the
following were not required to obtain a NPDES permit: mining operations, oil and gas
exploration, production, processing, treatment operations, transmission facilities. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2)(2000). However, the exclusion was contingent on the discharge
consisting of precipitation runoff that did not become "contaminated by contact with, or
do not come into contact with, any overburden, raw material, intermediate products,
finished product, byproduct, or waste products..." Id.
71 Id
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operations or transmission facilities" to include related construction
activities. 74 After noting this change, the Court then observed that the
amended language did not indicate whether Congress intended that the
NPDES exemption include storm water discharges contaminated only with
sediment.7 5 The Court ultimately interpreted § 402(l)(2) as indicating that
those sites included in the expanded definition of oil and gas-related
facilities are exempt from the NPDES permit requirement unless the storm
water discharge comes into contact with any of the items delineated in the
statute.7 6 The Court then concluded that Congressional intent as to
whether sediment should be included as one of the specified contaminants
was ambiguous. 77
Turning to the legislative history associated with § 402(l)(2), the
Court noted each party's proposed interpretatioD78 but nonetheless
determined that the legislative history did not indicate that Congress
intended to exempt storm water discharges contaminated with sediment
from the NPDES permit requirement.7 9 The Court then concluded that
"Congress was silent" and therefore it became necessary for the Court to
apply the second step of the Chevron test to the agency's interpretation.so
C. Step Two: Permissibilityof Statutory Interpretation
The Court began by noting that it was bound to uphold the decision
of the agency unless the Court finds that the decision was arbitrary and

74

NaturalRes.Def Council, 526 F.3d at 603 (citing Pub.L. No. 109-58, § 323, 119 Stat.
694 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362)).
75Id.
76
Id. The contaminants listed in the statute that would, in effect, trigger the NPDES
permit requirement include: overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished
products, by products and waste products. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2000).
Natural Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d 591, 603-04 ( 9th Cir. 2008). NRDC
asserted that Congress intended 'waste product' to include sediment. Brief of Petitioner,
supra note 11, at 28.
78
NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 604-05; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at
28-29; see Brief of Respondent, supra note 12, at 39-42.
7 NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 604-05.
so NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 605.
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capricious.8 ' The Court then listed several factors that the Court could
consider in examining the permissibility of EPA's interpretation including:
the plain and sensible meaning of the statute, the statutory provision in
relevant context, legislative purpose and intent, and the consistency of the
agency's position over time. 82 The Court further noted that, pursuant to
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, an agency interpretation that conflicts with
a previous interpretation deserves less deference than an agency
interpretation that is in accordance with previous interpretations.8 3
The majority then quoted EPA's modified interpretation of §
402(l)(2) and EPA's justification for its revision. 84 The Court concluded
that EPA's modified interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because of
the agency's changed position on what constitutes "contamination" under
§ 402(l)(2) of the CWA.8 5
The Court justified its conclusion by first illustrating the manner in
which oil and gas facilities would be treated under EPA's prior
interpretation.8 6 Under EPA's previous interpretation, if an oil and gas
facility discharged storm water that contained so much sediment that the
discharge violated a water quality standard, then the facility would have to
obtain a permit.87
The Court then noted that EPA modified its

81Id.

Id. (citing Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005); Good
Samaritan
Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)).
83
Id. (citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n. 30 (1987)).
8 Id. at 605-06(citing 71 Fed.Reg. at 898 Jan 6. 2006); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii))
(2006)). EPA's revised interpretation provided that a NPDES permit wouldn't be
required for the specified sites, if the storm water discharge consisted only of sediment,
even if the sediment contributed to a violation of a water quality standard. 71 Fed. Reg.
at 898. EPA stated that its interpretation was reasonable in light of Congress' expansion
of the 402(l)(2) exemption. 71 Fed.Reg. 33634. Furthermore, EPA contends that
because construction activities are no longer required to obtain an NPDES permit and
sediment is the pollutant most commonly associated with construction activity, it is
reasonable to infer that sediment discharges aren't "contaminated" for NPDES permit
purposes. 71 Fed.Reg. 33,634 (June 12, 2006).
s NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 606.
82

86id.
87

d; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1)(iii)(C) (1990).
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interpretation based only on a Congressional amendment that does not
mention either sediment or EPA's previous interpretation of § 402(1)(2).
The Court then examined two of EPA's arguments for its prior
interpretation.89 EPA first argued that the previous interpretation was a
"rule of administrative convenience." 90 Finally, EPA argued that prior to
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and its CWA amendments, EPA had never
considered how to treat sediment under existing regulations. 9 1
The Court dismissed both of EPA's arguments by referring to EPA
statements prior to the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.92 For
example, EPA had previously referred to potential serious water quality
impacts caused by storm water discharges containing sediment.9 3
Additionally, the Court quoted several statements attributable to EPA that
indicated EPA considered storm water discharges of sediment to have
significant adverse impacts on water quality. 94 Specifically, EPA had
indicated in statements made when it promulgated Phase I and Phase II
storm water rules, that it was concerned that storm water discharges
containing sediment would negatively impact the environment in
statements made when it promulgated Phase I and Phase II storm water
rules. 95 Thus, the Court concluded that these statements demonstrate both
that EPA's previous interpretation was not merely a rule of administrative
convenience and that EPA clearly considered how sediment should be
treated prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005.96
The Court further found that, in light of EPA's "complete
departure" from its previous interpretation, EPA's modified interpretation
was arbitrary and capricious. 97 The Court felt that its conclusion found
additional support in the fact that neither the amendment, the statutory

88
8

NaturalRes. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 606-07.
Id. at 607.

90Id
92 id.
93

Id. (quoting 55 Fed.Reg. at 48,033-34).
Id. (quoting 55 Fed.Reg. at 48,033-34).
9 Id. (citing 55 Fed.Reg. at 48,033-34).
96
Id.
9
'Id at 607-08.
94
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definitions nor the statutory exemption contained any reference to

sediment. 98
D. Dissent
The dissent also approached the question of whether EPA's
statutory interpretation was permissible by applying the two-step process
developed in Chevron.99 In applying the first step, the dissent agreed with
the majority's conclusion that the plain language of § 402(l)(2) does not
resolve the issue.100 Furthermore, the dissent acknowledged that the
legislative history associated with § 402(l)(2) does not resolve the issue.101
However, in applying the second step of the Chevron test, the
dissent declined to find EPA's interpretation arbitrary and capricious.1 02
The dissent began its analysis by restating the majority's argument and
noting that the majority justified its conclusion largely because EPA
revised its interpretation. 1 Specifically, the majority opinion based its
finding that EPA's interpretation was arbitrary and capricious on EPA's
"inconsistent and conflicting position[s]."l 0 4
The dissent then pointed to both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions where the courts had found that revised agency interpretations
were permissible. os Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit had previously
acknowledged that agency interpretations that conflict with previous
interpretations, although entitled to less deference, are still "entitled to
deference so long as the agency acknowledges and explains the

departure..."l06

" Id. at 608.
99 Id. (Callahan, J., dissenting).

1 Id.

101Id
102 Id. (characterizing

his conclusion as according "EPA's permissible interpretation
aFpropriate deference.")
3 Id. (citing id. at 606 (majority opinion)).
14Id. (citing id. at 607 (majority opinion)).
os Id. at 608-09.
10 Id. at 609 (quoting Resident Councils of Wash. v. Leavitt, 500 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
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The dissent argued that EPA provided a sufficient explanation of
its departure from its previous position.' 0 7 The dissent specifically noted
EPA's explanation that it would be inconsistent with the Energy Policy
Act amendments, which codified a permit exemption for oil and gasrelated construction activities, to require a permit for the discharge of
sediment, the pollutant most commonly associated with construction. os
Additionally, the dissent recognized that EPA had previously associated
construction permits with discharges of sediment. 109
The dissent also argued that EPA's original interpretation was less
than a "rigid position" because EPA had indicated that it intended to
consider additional information."i0 Furthermore, the dissent noted that
when Congress adopted the Energy Policy Act, EPA was required to
"conduct a fresh analysis" of the permit exemption."'
The dissent
ultimately contended that the CWA gave EPA the authority to create a
comprehensive NPDES permit system in light of all of the various
considerations before the agency.11 2 Therefore, according to the dissent,
EPA was acting within the scope of its authority, its modified
interpretation was a reasonable policy decision, and therefore the Court
should defer to the agency's determination.113
V. COMMENT
A. The Law of Unintended Consequences
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in NaturalResources Defense Council
v. E.P.A. is undoubtedly a short-term victory for environmental interests.
It effectively prevents EPA from providing a NPDES permit exemption to
oil and gas-related construction sites if those sites discharge storm water
107

id.

108Id. at 610 (citing 42 Fed.Reg. 42,654 (June 24, 2004)).

109 Id.
110 Id. (noting that EPA indicated that it intended to examine the impact on the oil and gas
industry, the impact on other CWA provisions, and the appropriate NPDES permit
requirement for small construction of oil and gas exploration and production facilities).
..
'Id. at 609.
112 id.

It'Id. at 610-11.
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runoff that contains too much sediment. However, environmental groups
would be wise to postpone the "Mission Accomplished" declaration until
the long-term effects of the instant decision can be better determined.
The dissent dutifully noted that the majority concluded that EPA's
revised interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because of the agency's
conflicting and changing positions. 114 If the dissent's characterization of
the majority's analysis is accurate and the majority opinion is truly
concluding that conflicting agency determinations result in arbitrary and
capricious agency action, then the significance of the instant decision
cannot be overstated.
Again, the outcome in the instant decision was favorable for
environmental interests. It reversed EPA action that would have had an
adverse impact on water quality. However, in the future, the roles could
be reversed. And, in that particular scenario, environmental groups would
likely argue that an agency's changed position does not result in arbitrary
and capricious agency action while industrial groups will be able to cite
the instant decision as standing for the contrary.
To illustrate the point, consider that in January a new President
will assume the role of Chief Executive. In that capacity, the new
President and his administration will have to choose whether to accept or
reject the environmental policies of the Bush administration. If the next
administration wishes to reverse the environmental policies of the last
eight years, either the administration or Congress must explicitly instruct
the agency to reverse course. In the absence of such authority, Congress
and the administration subject the agency determination to the possibility
that a court would find the agency's reversal arbitrary and capricious.
Environmental groups likely have many policies of the Bush
Administration that they would like to see reversed.115 For example, in
2007, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service removed the protected
status of the gray wolf which resulted in several states implementing wolf

"14 1d. at 608.
115See, e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council, The Bush Record,
http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/default.asp (last updated in 2005).
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hunting as a means of population control." 6 Although a federal court
recently overturned the decision, the agency has indicated that it will
continue efforts to delist the gray wolf." 7 If the next administration wants
to "completely depart" from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's
decision to delist the gray wolf, the instant decision could potentially act
as a barrier.
Again, many environmental groups would like to see this policy,
and others like it, reversed. But the instant decision effectively handicaps
the next administration's agencies.
And the Supreme Court has
recognized that previous policy determinations should not handicap
administrative agencies in this manner." 8 In Chevron, the Supreme Court
stated that agency determinations are "not instantly carved in stone." 1 9
Furthermore, the Court noted that an agency must consider "varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis."' 2
Here, EPA didn't carve its previous interpretation in stone, but the Ninth
Circuit did.
Again, the instant decision stands for the proposition that EPA
cannot change its mind without explicit authority. The instant decision
acts as an obstacle in the path of a more environmentally-friendly EPA if
it seeks to depart from previous policy positions. In the future,
environmental advocates will likely ask courts to uphold agency actions
that are a "complete departure" from the agency's previous interpretation.
Whether courts will adopt the reasoning of the majority in the instant
decision remains to be determined.
B. Arbitraryand Capricious?
In addition to its failure to consider the future consequences of its
holding, the Ninth Circuit fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent in
"6 Tom Meersman, Gray Wolf Gets Back on the ProtectedList, MINNEAPOLIS STARTRIBUNE, Sept. 30, 2008 available at

http://www.startribune.com/local/29898014.html?page= 1&c-y.
117 id.

118 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).

"9 Id. at 863.
20 Id. at 863-64.
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reaching its decision. For example, the majority quotes the Supreme
Court's explanation that "an agency interpretation of a relevant provision
which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to
considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view."'21
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court stated only that an
agency's revised interpretation was entitled to less deference. The
corollary to that rule is that, at a minimum, the revised agency
interpretation is nonetheless entitled to some deference. Arguably, the
majority in the instant decision fails to defer to the agency's determination
in any meaningful way. In fact, the majority barely addresses EPA's
explanation for its departure from its previous interpretation. EPA
provided the following statement in support of its revised interpretation:
[N]ow that Congress has broadened the 402(l)(2)
exemption to include construction activities at oil and gas
field operations, EPA believes that discharges of sediment
are not necessarily indicative of such contact [with raw
material, intermediate products, finished product,
byproduct or waste products]. Sediment is the pollutant
most commonly associated with construction activity.
Hence, exempting storm water discharges of sediment from
oil and gas construction sites from NPDES permitting
requirements reflects a reasonable (and EPA believes, the
best) interpretation of Congressional intent...122
The majority summarily dismissed EPA's justification by noting that the
Congressional amendment to section 402(l)(2) failed to mention either
sediment or EPA's previous interpretation.12 3 Furthermore, the majority
failed to address EPA's contention that an exemption for construction
activities, by implication, creates an exemption for sediment, which EPA

121 Nat.

Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d 591, 605 (9" Cir. 2008) (quoting I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30 (1987)).
122
Id. at 606 (quoting 71 Fed.Reg. at 33,634 (June 12, 2006)).
Id. at 606-07.
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contends is the pollutant most commonly associated with construction
activities. 124
Thus, the Court seems to declare that any agency determination
that conflicts with a previous agency determination is arbitrary and
capricious per se, if Congress did not explicitly authorize the departure.
A rule of per se arbitrary and capriciousness is not what the
Supreme Court has sanctioned, even in the context of changes in an
agency's position.12 5 The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that, if
Congress' intent is ambiguous, an agency determination is entitled to
deference.126
The Ninth Circuit itself recognizes that every agency
determination, including a determination that conflicts with a previous
position, is entitled to some level of deference.1 27 Commentators have
long recognized that courts owe some minimal level of deference to
administrative decisions. 128
Thus, the dissent seems to reach the
conclusion most consistent with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent; "[B]ecause EPA's 'interpretation is at least as plausible as
competing ones,' this court should defer to its construction."l 29
VI. CONCLUSION

It is easy to characterize the Ninth Circuit's holding and analysis in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A. as a tremendous victory for
124 Id. at 606.
125 See,

e.g. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) ("[T]he mere
fact that
an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal").
126 Id. at 740-41 (noting that the Court "accord[s] deference
to agencies under
Chevron.. .because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute,
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency and desired the agency (rather than the courts)
to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows").
127 Resident Councils of Washington v. Leavitt, 500 F.3d 1025, 1036 (91 Cir. 2007)
("[A]n agency's "new" position is entitled to deference "so long as the agency
acknowledges and explains the departure from its prior views") (citing Seldovia Native
Ass'n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9 th Cir. 1990).
128
See Sam Kalen, ChangingAdministrations andEnvironmental GuidanceDocuments,
23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13, 17 (2008).
29

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 526 F.3d 591, 611 (9 " Cir. 2008) (quoting Good
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shala, 508 U.S. 402, 417) (1993).
1

592

CHALLENGING

AGENCYDECISIONS

environmental interests. Once the proverbial dust settles, NRDC wins and
industrial groups lose. Water quality is preserved at the expense of
industrial interests. Oil and gas-related construction sites must obtain
NPDES permits if its storm water discharges contain too much sediment.
But, as the old adage goes, one should be careful of what one
wishes for. The Ninth Circuit's decision stands for the proposition that
once an agency has made an initial determination, the agency would be
acting arbitrarily and capriciously if it were to reverse course without
explicit authority. In present circumstances, environmental advocates
might find the Ninth Circuit's approach desirable, despite the fact that its
analysis is inconsistent with both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent. However, circumstances change. It is very likely that issues
dealing with agency interpretations of Congressional intent will rise again.
Perhaps at that time, environmental advocates will wish administrative
agencies were not constrained by the Ninth Circuit's holding that
"complete departures" from previous agency determinations are arbitrary
and capricious.
R. CALEB COLBERT
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